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4 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: NVN Civilian Casualty Figures and Methodology

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1. This is an addendum to the 4 April ORR memo on casualties in North Vietnam. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] memo is for your background information only.

2. The casualty estimates in the ORR memorandum are a combination of independently derived CIA estimates, and DIA estimates refined by CIA analysts. The estimates of the civilian and military casualties resulting from attacks on fixed targets and the military casualties resulting from aerial reconnaissance are DIA estimates weighted by CIA to reflect data obtained

[REDACTED] other intelligence sources. The estimates of civilian casualties attributable to armed reconnaissance are strictly CIA estimates, since DIA makes no attempt to estimate these casualties.

3. The major differences between CIA and DIA estimates are as follows:

a) DIA estimates of casualties resulting from attacks on fixed targets are expressed in a broad range of minimum and maximum casualties.* The maximum figures assume that the population in the target area was unwarned; the minimum figures assume warning and full resort to civil defense and protective measures. We have found fairly consistently that the initial attacks on JCS fixed targets have inflicted casualties that are four times greater than the minimum DIA estimates. Consequently, we have weighted the DIA estimates by a factor

* The maximum figure would generally be 10 times greater than the minimum; e.g., 100 - 1,000.

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[REDACTED]

of four for all initial strikes on JCS fixed targets and accepted the DIA estimates for all targets undergoing restrikes. Thus if a DIA casualty estimate for an initial strike is presented as ranging from 12-120, we would weight the minimum figure by four and estimate casualties as 48.

b) The estimates of military casualties resulting from armed reconnaissance are probably the most unreliable of all our casualty estimates. We have accepted DIA factors for estimating these casualties with the exception of specific categories --

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c) Civilian casualties resulting from armed reconnaissance are estimated only by CIA. We develop our estimates on an all-

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George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

[REDACTED]

4 APR 1967

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B. Methodology for Estimating Casualties

1. Fixed Targets

The basic method of determining casualty estimates for attacks on individual fixed targets rests on a casualty prediction methodology developed by US intelligence analysts. This method is essentially an application of the predictable lethal effects of given types of ordnance to known target environments, particularly their population density. These factors are applied in conjunction with roof cover bomb damage assessments based on photographic analysis, and operations reports from specific attack missions. A number of casualties is determined by multiplying the average lethal area of the bombs dropped in target areas by the population density of the area and the number of structures in the area. These estimates are expressed in a broad range of minimum and maximum casualties.* The maximum figures assume that the population in the target area was unwarned; the minimum figures assume warning and full resort to civil defense and protective measures.

The casualty estimates derived by US intelligence specialists are weighted by CIA

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other sources. We have found fairly consistently that the initial attacks on JCS targets have inflicted casualties that are four times greater than the minimum military estimates. Consequently, we have adjusted the military estimates of minimum number of casualties by a factor of four for all initial strikes on fixed targets, and accepted the minimum estimate for all targets undergoing restrikes.

2. Armed Reconnaissance

1. Civilian Casualties

The CIA estimates of casualties resulting from armed reconnaissance strikes are expressed through a casualty/sortie rate

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with adjustments made to account for differences in the population

* The maximum figure would generally be 10 times greater than the minimum.

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density, the number of sorties or alternatively the tons of bombs dropped, and days of air action in each route package area.

^{1.}
~~2.~~ Military Casualties

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The estimate of military casualties is, therefore, based on pilot reports of the number of targets destroyed or damaged, weighted by Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) factors for the probable number of casualties to be expected for each type of target destroyed or damaged.

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24 January 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing of General Maxwell Taylor

1. On the 11th of January [redacted] to relay a request from General Maxwell Taylor for a briefing. [redacted] had with him a memorandum from Taylor outlining exactly what he wanted. [redacted]

[redacted] I have never seen General Taylor more testy nor more critical of intelligence production. He started out by saying that, as I well knew, he wanted to go in some depth into the matter of North Vietnamese logistics. (This was of course a much narrower field than we had been asked to discuss but Walsh shifted gears admirably.)

1. General Taylor, however, came out fighting, with the flat statement that no one has ever concentrated on the logistics problem (as opposed, for example, to Order of Battle). He questioned whether the intelligence community was doing enough on logistics and whether we have on board adequately qualified logisticians. ("We may have a lot of dumb clucks in the rest of the Army, but in logistics we are superb. We should get some of these people, and I don't mean somebody who has just served a tour in G-4.") Walsh said that he thought we had a good understanding of the general nature of the North Vietnamese system although we of course did not have all the details filled in; we feel confident, however, that we have a balanced enough picture so that we could spot situations where our information is inadequate, and we don't believe that it really is inadequate enough to degrade our estimates. He went on to say that the quality of professionalism on logistic matters is good, both in CIA and DIA.

5. In the course of a discussion which was somewhat disjointed because General Taylor repeatedly came back to the subject of logistics although professing interest in a broader briefing, Walsh managed to show him a number of examples of finished intelligence [redacted] and made a good case for the quality of the intelligence without being unduly defensive.

6. During all this General Taylor said that "the system" has not produced fundamental answers but has come up with a number of "unreconciled statements." As examples he cited:

a. The figures on enemy killed in action, if augmented by a reasonable number of wounded, plus MACV's figures on infiltration, add up to "an impossibility." He said that his quarrel here was largely with MACV.

b. If the KLA figures are correct, then the woods would have to be full of wounded personnel, but we don't find them.

c. The estimate that a daily input of only 50 to 100 tons of supplies is needed to support enemy action in the South represents "a ridiculous figure" when we consider the large numbers of trucks that are continually spotted coming down from the North. Either the figure is wrong or the North Vietnamese are stockpiling for a major offensive.

7. With respect to trucks, Mr. Walsh pointed out that we do see surges of trucks from time to time but that the community is in agreement that there is no current excess of trucking which would tend to throw off the agreed figures. General Taylor mentioned reports of inordinately large numbers of trucks moving supplies. He acknowledged that these were from pilot sightings and conceded that they are likely to be highly exaggerated. He agreed with Walsh's point that these reports contain a great deal of duplicate counting and never give the direction of travel, so that totals reported should not be used indiscriminately as equating to actual supply movements.

8. General Taylor did not ask specifically for anything more from us but seemed to be reflecting a general feeling of malaise about the whole problem. We can, I think, take some action:

a. Prepare for General Taylor a logistics map,

[redacted]

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capacities, etc., which Taylor asked whether we had. I understand this will not be too much of a job to prepare.

b. Arrange to give him a summary or, if he desires, a briefing on the conclusions reached at the conference on logistics which is scheduled for February 19th in Honolulu.

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c. General Taylor described as highly important the need for a detailed study on NVA/VC medical services.

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d. Tailor the Vietnamese briefing for the next Board meeting, which in the normal course of events would come around the middle of February, to go a little more deeply into some of the questions raised today by General Taylor. We

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MEMORANDUM FOR: *Paul Walsh, OER*

*Paul - a bit rough --
if you want more or different,
speak.*



STAT

23 Jan '68
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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FOREIGN SHIPPING TO NORTH VIETNAM IN 1967

1. Ship Arrivals

During 1967 there were 385 foreign ship arrivals in North Vietnam, seven more than in 1966. Communist ship arrivals increased only slightly -- from 305 to 308 -- but there was a major change in their composition. Soviet arrivals increased from 122 to 181 while Chinese arrivals dropped from 138 to 97. The remaining Communist arrivals included 24 by Polish, 4 by Bulgarian, and 1 each by Cuban and Albanian ships. Free World arrivals increased from 74 to 78 with only minor changes in composition. Sixty-seven of the arrivals were by British-flag ships, most of them under charter to Communist China and owned or operated by Hong Kong firms known to be controlled by Chinese Communists. The remaining 11 Free World arrivals were by ships flying the Cypriot, Italian, Lebanese, and Maltese flags. Most of these ships were under North Vietnamese Charter.

2. Imports and Exports by Sea

Following a pattern similar to that in 1966, North Vietnam's seaborne trade dropped by approximately 10 percent in 1967, from 2.1 to 1.9 million tons. This was the net effect of an increase in imports by sea from .9 to 1.3 million tons and a decrease in exports by sea from 1.2 to .6 million tons.

a. Imports

The increase in North Vietnam's imports by sea from 926,000 tons in 1966 to 1,349,000 tons in 1967 resulted primarily from a rise in bulk food imports (from 78,000 to 447,000 tons) and to a lesser extent from rises in imports of petroleum (from 201,000 to 246,000 tons) and miscellaneous and general cargoes (from 407,000 to 496,000 tons). The bulk food imported consisted largely of rice from China and wheat flour from the USSR, much of it brought in to compensate for poor harvests in North Vietnam during the year. While imports of many commodities were rising, fertilizer imports dropped from 227,000 tons in 1966 to 147,000 tons in 1967.

Imports from Communist countries increased from 810,000 to 1,302,000 tons. Imports from the USSR which increased from 426,000 to 632,000 tons made up the largest share. Next in importance were imports from Communist China which increased from 156,000 to 434,000 tons. The remaining imports from Communist countries came from Eastern Europe, North Korea, and Cuba.

Imports from Free World countries decreased from 116,000 tons in 1966 to 48,000 tons in 1967. The most important single source was Cambodia which supplied 29,000 tons. Imports from Japan dropped from 42,000 to only 2,000 tons and imports from Western Europe from 24,000 to 7,000 tons.

Soviet ships carried the largest share of North Vietnamese imports in 1967 -- 668,000 tons. Chinese Communist ships carried 241,000 tons; Eastern European, 101,000; and Free World, 328,000.

b. Exports

North Vietnam's exports by sea dropped from 1,168,000 tons in 1966 to 573,000 in 1967. Coal exports dropped from 938,000 to 432,000 tons. Cement exports dropped from 99,000 to 35,000 tons with none taking place after April. Pig iron exports dropped from 40,000 to 22,000 tons with none taking place after May. No exports of anatite, which fell from 318,000 tons in 1965 to 10,000 tons in 1966, took place in 1967. The chief recipients of North Vietnamese exports by sea in 1967 were Japan which received 266,000 tons (mostly coal) and China which received 175,000 tons (mostly coal).

3. Congestion and Other Problems in Haiphong

Record deliveries of bulk foodstuffs, general cargo, and other imports to Haiphong during the period March through June caused severe congestion in the port, particularly in May, June, and July. This congestion was reflected in increased accumulations of cargo in open storage areas adjacent to the wharves and, more important, in increased layover times for ships calling at the port. Average layover times for ships that departed Haiphong in April before the congestion became serious were 12 days. During July and August when ships that had arrived in port at the height of the congestion were departing, average layover times for departing ships reached highs of 24 and 33 days with some individual ships reporting stays in port in excess of two months.

Despite alleviation of the congestion at Haiphong as import deliveries decreased from the record levels attained during the first half of the year, accumulation of cargo in open storage areas of the port appeared to reach a new high in October. While it is likely that some of these goods were stored

there because of the safe haven provided by the proximity to foreign ships, there is reason to believe that some of it was there because of a slowing of the movement of goods to the interior as a result of the interdiction of rail and highway bridges out of Haiphong by US bombing in late September and early October. The only reason that accumulations of cargo in Haiphong were not greater is that the North Vietnamese had ferries and pontoon bridges to put into operation when the bridges were knocked out and a growing fleet of lighters with which to speed the discharge of cargoes from sea-going ships.

Another factor that complicated port operations in Haiphong during 1967 was silting in the shallow approaches to the harbor. There is evidence that the limiting draft in the approaches to the port decreased from 28 feet at the beginning of the year to 26 feet at the end of the year. Such a drop could reduce by more than 1,000 tons the amount of cargo delivered by a 10,000 deadweight ton ship.

Maxwell Taylor
Helen

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